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MITOCHONDRIAL REPLACEMENT: ETHICS AND IDENTITY
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ABSTRACT
Mitochondrial replacement techniques (MRTs) have the potential to allow
prospective parents who are at risk of passing on debilitating or even
life-threatening mitochondrial disorders to have healthy children to whom
they are genetically related. Ethical concerns have however been raised
about these techniques. This article focuses on one aspect of the ethical
debate, the question of whether there is any moral difference between
the two types of MRT proposed: Pronuclear Transfer (PNT) and Maternal
Spindle Transfer (MST). It examines how questions of identity impact on the
ethical evaluation of each technique and argues that there is an important
difference between the two. PNT, it is argued, is a form of therapy based on
embryo modification while MST is, instead, an instance of selective repro-
duction. The article’s main ethical conclusion is that, in some circum-
stances, there is a stronger obligation to use PNT than MST.
1. INTRODUCTION
Mitochondrial replacement techniques (MRTs) have the
potential to allow prospective parents who are at risk of
passing on mitochondrial disorders to have healthy chil-
dren to whom they are genetically related. Mitochondrial
disorders are often debilitating or even life-shortening and
the development of techniques to prevent them is a
welcome prospect. Ethical concerns have however been
raised about these techniques.1 This article focuses on just
one aspect of the ethical debate, the question of whether
there is any moral difference between the two types of
MRT proposed: Pronuclear Transfer (PNT) and Mater-
nal Spindle Transfer (MST). It examines how questions of
identity impact on the ethical evaluation of each technique
and argues that there is an important difference between
the two. PNT, it is argued, is a form of therapy based on
embryomodificationwhileMST is, instead, an instance of
selective reproduction. The paper’s main ethical conclu-
sion is that, in some circumstances, theremaybe a stronger
obligation to utilise PNT than to use MST.
2. MITOCHONDRIAL DISORDERS
AND MITOCHONDRIAL
REPLACEMENT TECHNIQUES
Mitochondria produce the energy needed for cellular
functions. They also carry a genome (mtDNA) that is
separate from the nuclear genome and is maternally
inherited. If mutations occur in mtDNA, this can affect
the ability of mitochondria to produce the energy needed
for cellular functions. High concentrations of mutant
mtDNA can result in a variety of mitochondrial disor-
ders, which can cause severe suffering and premature
death. One example of a devastating mitochondrial dis-
order is MELAS (Mitochondrial Encephalomyopathy,
Lactic Acidosis and Stroke-like episodes). The stroke-like
episodes caused by MELAS may result in loss of brain
1 For example, a number of ethical concerns have been raised about the
use of MRTs, including: the health risks of having children with three
progenitors; the use of sex selection in conjunction with MRTs; the
permissibility of MRT research on embryos; severing the mitochondrial
genetic tie between intending mother and child; and whether MRTs
constitute ‘germ line modification’ and/or ‘genetic modification’; A.
Bredenoord & P. Braude. Ethics of Mitochondrial Gene Replacement:
From Bench to Bedside. Br Med J 2011; 342: 879; Nuffield Council on
Bioethics. Novel Techniques for the Prevention of Mitochondrial DNA
Disorders: An Ethical Review. London: Nuffield Council on Bioethics;
2012; F. Baylis. The Ethics of Creating Children With Three Genetic
Parents. Reprod BioMed Online 2013; 26: 531–534.
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function, dementia, headaches, loss of vision, loss of
muscular function, and seizures; the disease typically
begins to present itself in childhood.2
Approximately one in every 6,500 children born in the
UK has a mitochondrial disorder.3 The existing methods
for avoiding mitochondrial disorders are predictive tests
such as pre-implantation genetic diagnosis (PGD) and
pre-natal diagnosis (PND). One difficulty with these,
however, is that when parents receive adverse test results,
their only option – if they want to avoid a mitochondrial
disorder – is egg donation (or adoption). And while there
are of course plenty of flourishing donor-conceived fami-
lies in existence, some people attach great value to having
a child who is entirely genetically ‘theirs’. For these
people, egg donation will be a seen as poor ‘second best’.
In addition, in some countries, donor eggs are scarce, so
that this option is further constrained.4 In an attempt to
address this, two different mitochondrial replacement
techniques (MRTs) are being developed.5
(i) Maternal Spindle Transfer (MST)
The maternal spindle is a cluster of chromosomes that
make up the egg’s nuclear DNA.MST involves removing
the maternal spindle from the mother’s egg and placing it
in an enucleated donor egg. This reconstructed egg con-
tains the mother’s nuclear DNA and a donor’s healthy
mitochondria. The egg is then fertilized so that it can
develop into an embryo.
(ii) Pronuclear Transfer (PNT)
PNT begins with two eggs: one from the mother, which
contains diseased mitochondria, and a donor egg with
healthy mitochondria. Both are fertilized and the two
pronuclei (i.e. the respective genetic contributions from
both the egg and sperm) are removed from each zygote.
The enucleated zygote produced by the mother’s egg and
the father’s sperm is then discarded. The two pronuclei
that were created using the donor’s egg and the father’s
sperm are also discarded. Next, the two pronuclei taken
from the parents’ embryo are injected into the enucleated
‘donor’ embryo. At the end of the procedure, the embryo
produced contains the parents’ nuclear DNA and the
donor’s healthy mitochondria.6
The UK Parliament recently approved The Human
Fertilisation and Embryology (Mitochondrial Donation)
Regulations 2015 (HFER 2015) which further amend the
Human Fertilisation and Embryology Act 1990 and, as
of 29 October 2015, will make the UK the first country in
the world to permit the licensed clinical use of MST and
PNT on humans.7 However, the UK’s Human Fertiliza-
tion and Embryology Authority (HFEA) has stated that
before either technique can be made available for clinical
use, the HFEA will ‘develop a licensing framework
through which applications can be considered from clini-
cians wanting to offer the two techniques set out in the
regulations’ and ‘each application will be decided on a
case by case basis and in accordance with the latest sci-
entific advice.’8
3. GENES, ORIGINS, AND IDENTITY
The connection between genes, biological origins, and
identity is important for the ethical analysis of MRTs.
2 A.L. Bredenoord. et al. Dealing With Uncertainties: Ethics of Prena-
tal Diagnosis and Preimplantation Genetic Diagnosis to Prevent
Mitochondrial Disorders, Hum Reprod Update 2008; 14: 83–94.
3 Nuffield Council on Bioethics. op. cit. note 1, p. 25; A.M. Schaefer,
et al. Prevalence of Mitochondrial DNA Disease in Adults. Ann Neurol
2008; 63: 35–39.
4 For example, it has been reported that countries such as the UK,
Sweden, and Australia have experienced a scarcity of donor eggs; A.S.
Svanberg. Characterization of Potential Oocyte Donors in Sweden.
Hum Reprod 2003; 18; 2205–2215; I. Torjesen. Fertility Regulator Tells
Clinics to Treat Egg And Sperm Donors Better to Boost Numbers. Br
Med J 2005; 344; J. Medew. The Age – IVF Deal Sees American Eggs
Heading Down Under. 2013. Available at: http://monashivf.com/the-
age-ivf-deal-sees-american-eggs-heading-down-under/ [cited 2014 Sept
20].
5 UK Department of Health. Mitochondrial Donation: A Consultation
on Draft Regulation to Permit the Use of New Treatment Techniques to
Prevent the Transmission of a Serious Mitochondrial Disease From
Mother to Child. 2014. Available at: https://www.gov.uk/government/
uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/285251/mitochondrial
_donation_consultation_document_24_02_14_Accessible_V0.4.pdf
[cited 2014 Sept 20].
6 Researchers are currently unsure whether a small amount of the
unhealthy mitochondria from the discarded embryo is likely to be inad-
vertently transferred to the new embryo during the process of transfer-
ring the pronuclei. Nuffield, op. cit. note 1, p. 67.
7 Human Fertilisation and Embryology (Mitochondrial Donation)
Regulations 2015 (HFER 2015). Available at: http://www.legislation
.gov.uk/ukdsi/2015/9780111125816/pdfs/ukdsi_9780111125816_en.pdf
[cited 2015 May 11].
8 Some, such as Reinhardt et al., have raised concerns about the pos-
sibility of health complications arising from ‘mismatching’ between
nuclear DNA and the donor’s mtDNA. The HFEA has responded to
these concerns by stating that the available evidence on any possible
‘mismatches’ resulting from MRT use ‘did not show cause for concern’
and that the HFEA would continue to review evidence on MRTs.
Previous statements from Nuffield Council on Bioethics support the
ongoing review of evidence relating to this area of mitochondrial
biology: ‘further studies using human embryos and research with
animals will be important to disclose any potential for the manipulation
of embryos and gametes to cause chromosomal or epigenetic problems’,
Nuffield, op. cit. note 1, p.66; K. Reinhart, D. Dowling & E. Morrow.
Mitochondrial replacement, evolution and the clinic. Science 2013; 341:
1345–1346; Human Fertilisation and Embryology Authority (HFEA).
2013; HFEA statement regarding the Klaus Reinhardt et al. Science
paper ‘Mitochondrial replacement, evolution, and the clinic’. Available
at:http://www.hfea.gov.uk/8178.html?size=large [Accessed 2015 April
27]; Human Fertilisation and Embryology Authority (HFEA). 2015.
Statement on mitochondrial donation. Available at: http://www.hfea
.gov.uk/9606.html [Accessed 2015 April 27]. It is beyond the scope of
this article to discuss this contended area of science in further detail.
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There are several relevant ways in which these factors
might determine identity, depending upon what sense of
‘identity’ is being employed.9
At the most fundamental level, genetic information has
been seen as underpinning the numerical identity of
persons.10 Person A and person B are numerically identi-
cal if and only if A and B are the very same human
organism: if and only if A is B. Numerical identity con-
cerns a very basic metaphysical means of determining
questions of existence in terms of how we can refer to one
and the same entity in any possible set of circumstances.
In the case of persons, it allows us to determine who it is
we are referring to at the most basic of levels. So, for
example, we can say that President Barak Obama is
numerically identical with the man who won the US presi-
dential election in 2008 and what this means is that they
(Obama and the 2008 presidential winner) are the very
same entity – one and the same human being, not merely
two people with a lot of similarities. This last aspect is
important to emphasize in the case of numerical identity,
as it allows us to keep reference to a particular individual
fixed through a range of possible scenarios.
The challenge for an account of numerical identity is to
explain what it is that determines the entity that we in fact
are, despite the vast range of possible different properties
and experiences we may or may not have. The explana-
tion that our numerical identity is established in terms of
our being a particular human organism is not fully satis-
factory as it stands, as there are numerous ways our state
as a human organism can be affected or changed that
wouldn’t themselves constitute a change in numerical
identity. For example, various physical characteristics,
such as height, weight, or even intelligence can be a result
of environmental factors; we may lose parts of our body,
for example the loss of limbs through accident, or even
gain new parts, such as organs through transplantation.
Although all of these might change or alter properties of
our human organism, they are themselves all contingent –
they might not have happened. As such, there needs to be
a means of determining what it is that fixes our being the
entity that we in fact are, in a way that is not open to
contingent or accidental change. One of the most com-
pelling accounts has been to provide an account of what
it is to be the human organism that we are in terms of our
biological origins, that is, our originating gametes.11
Hence it is a necessary feature of human organisms that
we have the very same biological origins that we do, in
fact, have, thereby giving us a causal account of our
identity in terms of our originating genetic constitution.
Therefore, I am the human organism I am in terms of my
having the originating gametes I do, in fact, have. They
are a necessary property of being me and anything that
does not have the same originating gametes cannot be
me.12
There are also other ways that genes determine a per-
son’s identity but we must be careful to distinguish the
different senses of ‘identity’ in play. One major role is
determining a person’s ‘qualitative identity’ because they
control, wholly or in part, many of our qualitative prop-
erties. These properties can be entirely physical, such as
the nature of our chromosomes, or can interact with
environmental factors to affect such things as our height,
weight, intelligence, etc. Genes can also have implications
for our ‘social identity’ insofar as social significance is
placed on familial ancestry, genetic relatedness to other
people, and future-orientated concerns about continuing
the family line.
Our focus in this article, though, is on numerical iden-
tity. This sense of identity plays an important role in
debates about genetic selection techniques for future
persons through Parfit’s Non-Identity Problem.13 In what
follows, we argue that MRTs provide us with a new and
interesting variation on the traditional Non-Identity
Problem.14
4. THE NON-IDENTITY PROBLEM AND
THE MST/PNT DISTINCTION
In the context of human reproduction, the Non-Identity
Problem arises most often because of the plausibility of
what Parfit terms the Origin View. This says that:
. . . each person has this distinctive necessary property:
that of having grown from the particular pair of cells
from which this person in fact grew.15
9 We will leave to one side for now further philosophical problems
pertaining to the coherence of this conception of identity, such as have
been raised by P. Geach. Reference and Generality. 3rd ed. Ithaca, NY:
Cornell University Press; 1980; D. Lewis. On the Plurality of Worlds.
Oxford: Blackwell; 1986.
10 More precisely, as we shall discuss, it is the originating gametes that
have the central role in a causal account of our identity and thereby
serve rigidly to designate the same individual across all possible worlds.
11 S. Kripke. Naming and Necessity. Oxford: Blackwell; 1980; D. Parfit.
Reasons and Persons. Oxford: Oxford University Press; 1984.
12 Note that this is a necessary property but not a sufficient one for the
identity of a human being. This is due to cases such as monozygotic
twins, where both have the same originating gametes. However, the
important point for the identity arguments is that difference in origi-
nating gametes must therefore indicate difference in identity.
13 J. Feinberg. Wrongful Life and the Counterfactual Element in
Harming. Soc Philos Policy 1987; 4(1): 145–178; M. Hanser. Harming
Future People. Philos Public Aff 1990; 19: 47–70; D. Velleman. Persons
in Prospect. Philos Public Aff 2008; 36: 221–288; A. Wrigley. Genetic
Selection and Modal Harms. Monist 2006; 89(4): 505–525; A. Wrigley.
Harm To Future Persons: Non-Identity Problems and Counterpart
Solutions. Ethical Theory Moral Pract 2012; 15: 175–190.
14 There remain additional concerns beyond the scope of this paper,
such as whether adding a ‘third parent’ gene into someone’s germ line is
a harm or benefit in some non-person affecting way, such as by being a
societal good or ill.
15 Parfit. op. cit. note 11, p. 352.
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If the Origin View (also termed ‘gametic essentialism’)
is true then my existence is dependent, in a very strong
sense, on the fact that a particular egg (E1) and particular
sperm (S1) came together. Had they not – for example,
had S2 fertilized E1 instead of S1 – then I would not have
existed; someone else (a numerically distinct person)
would have existed instead. We do not have space here to
argue for the Origin View but merely note that it is widely
regarded as a plausible principle and that its supposed
truth underpins a great deal of the literature on the Non-
Identity Problem.16 Hence, we will be assuming its truth
for the time being. The arguments that follow are, there-
fore, for the most part conditional, in that we are explor-
ing what to think of the ethical differences between MST
and PNT on the assumption that something like The
Origin View is true. If the Origin View turned out to be
false then things may have to be rethought.17
Gametic essentialism generates the Non-Identity
Problem. This problem is famously introduced by Parfit
by way of an example.18 We are asked to imagine a
woman who wishes to have a child. She knows that if she
conceives now, her child will have a debilitating condition
(although still have a life worth living), whereas if she
waits a fewmonths to conceive, her child will not have the
condition. The woman chooses to conceive straightaway
and gives birth to a child with the foreseen debilitating
condition. Arguably, the child created has not been
harmed by her mother’s choice because, if the mother had
waited and conceived later, this particular child would
not have been born at all. Instead, a numerically different
child would have been born because different originating
gametes would have been involved in the conception.
Hence the child cannot be said to have been harmed
because she cannot be said to be worse off than she
otherwise would have been. If the mother had waited, a
(numerically) different child would have been born
instead, for the children in each of the two scenarios are
not numerically identical.
Two elements are required for Non-Identity Problem
to be properly understood. One is the gametic essentialist
requirement; the other is an understanding of harm not in
the sense of ‘violation of rights’, but in the sense of ‘worse
off than otherwise would have been’.19 This is relevant to
MRT in terms of whether or not one can consider living
with mitochondrial disorders harmful (or their avoidance
a benefit).
Claims to harm where different originating gametes
are involved are thereby avoided under Non-Identity
Problem on the grounds that one cannot make the
required comparison of relative levels of welfare between
being created with or without the inherited genetic traits
in question because any alternative selection of gametes
would have resulted in a different person. Had different
gametes been selected (for example, in such a way as to
exclude those that might cause the mitochondrial genetic
disorder), the resulting zygote would not have developed
into that person and that person wouldn’t have existed.
Any claims to having been harmed in this way therefore
come down to a choice between existence with a genetic
disorder and not existing at all. As such, these choices
cannot be deemed to harm the individual by making them
‘worse off than they otherwise would have been’ because
the only alternative to that life is non-existence.
The Non-Identity Problem when applied to (some)
reproductive technologies gives us the Non-Identity
Claim. This says:
When we use technique x this causes a (numerically)
different person to be born, i.e. someone other than the
person who would have been born if we had not used
technique x.
We can now turn to ask whether the Non-Identity Claim
is true of MRT? If it is, children created using MRT
cannot be said to have been harmed (or benefitted) by
mitochondrial replacement, or at least it would not be
harm in the usual comparative ‘harm-to-interests’ sense.
We argue in what follows that the Non-Identity Claim is
true of standard cases of MST but not true of standard
cases of PNT.
The question as to whether the Non-Identity Claim
holds for MRT depends on which method is chosen
(PNT or MST), given that the methods differ in terms of
when the mitochondrial replacement takes place. As the
Origin View is central to the Non-Identity Problem, then
any selective choice of gametes in the MRT process prior
to the fusion between sperm and egg would potentially be
subject to this problem.20 WithMST, manipulation of the
maternal gamete is carried out prior to fertilization,
whereupon it is fertilized with an available sperm. As the
very process of manipulating the maternal gamete takes
time, the sperm used to fertilize it (in standard cases) will
be different from the sperm that would have fertilized it if
the maternal gamete had not undergone manipulation.
16 For a critical discussion of the role of the Origin View, see P. Mackie.
How Things Might Have Been: Individuals, Kinds, and Essential Proper-
ties. Oxford: Oxford University Press; 2006.
17 The necessity of origins thesis is not universally accepted, although it
is widely endorsed, and even famous detractors of it such as Lewis, op.
cit. note 9, and Mackie, op. cit. note 16, recognize the importance of a
match of origins in determining the identity of an individual.
18 Parfit, op. cit. note 11, pp. 358–59.
19 A discussion of concepts of ‘harm’ can be found in J. Feinberg. Harm
to Others: The Moral Limits of the Criminal Law. New York: Oxford
University Press; 1984. A summary can also be found in S. Wilkinson.
Bodies for Sale: Ethics and Exploitation in the Human Body Trade.
London: Routledge; 2003. 59–60.
20 It should be emphasized that the manipulation or damage of gametes
is not subject to non-identity arguments in the same way unless that
process itself changes the identity of the gamete(s).
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This means that a numerically different individual will be
born than if MST had not been used.
The reason we have been referring to ‘standard’ cases is
that MST is not necessarily identity-affecting because, on
our view, an egg which has its mitochondria replaced
could remain numerically the same egg. However, there is
good reason to think that in practice most cases of MST
will be identity-affecting because using MST will (nearly
always) mean that a different spermatozoon will come to
fertilize the egg. It is possible in principle for a particular
spermatozoon to be identified at the outset as the one that
the couple wishes to use (regardless of whether or not
MST takes place), and in cases like that, identity could be
preserved: for the very same egg and the very same sper-
matozoon would be used irrespective of whether MST
takes place. In practice, however, it is extremely doubtful
that the identification of a single spermatozoon in
advance is something that will happen (not least because
there is no clinical reason to do this). So, in any case
where fertilization takes place by merely mixing numer-
ous spermatozoa with the post-MST egg, the chances of
this egg being fertilized by the very same individual sper-
matozoon that would have fertilized it had MST not
taken place must be miniscule. Identity-preservation can
only be guaranteed when the identification of a single
spermatozoon in advance takes place. Accordingly, we
hold that MST is nearly always identity-affecting
because, even if the egg is still the same egg after MST,
there’s a very high chance that it will be fertilized by a
different spermatozoon.
With PNT, however, the intervention happens after
fertilization, the gametes used are unaffected, and so the
Non-Identity Problem does not arise. This means that
PNT is capable of benefiting or harming any child created
in a straightforward ‘harm-to-interests’ sense. PNT could
therefore be a beneficial treatment for a particular indi-
vidual who would otherwise have suffered from debilitat-
ing mitochondrial disease. Given that one of the charges
laid against MRT is that it is a reproductive technology
whose only function is to allow a woman carrying certain
mitochondrial genetic mutations to be genetically related
to the child they gestate,21 this approach might answer
those critics by establishing that the method of PNT is
about improving the health of a particular child.22
5. ETHICAL IMPLICATIONS
We turn now to discuss the ethical implications for MST
and PNT. As concluded in the previous section,MST and
PNT are different in the following respect: the Non-
Identity Claim is true of (at least most) instances of MST;
hence MST can best be classified as a kind of selective
reproduction. It is not, however, true of PNT; so PNT is
embryo-modification or embryo-therapy, rather than
selective reproduction.23 This section asks what ethical
implications this difference might have. Assuming that
MST and PNT are equally safe, effective, and cost-
effective in all respects, does this difference matter ethi-
cally? We focus on two main differences. First, there is a
suggestion that ‘at risk’ parents have stronger moral
reasons to accept PNT than to accept MST because
failing to use PNT (but not failing to use MST) could
directly harm their future children. Second, we look
briefly at the idea that objections to mitochondrial
replacement based on concerns about eugenics and
human dignity engage more strongly in the case of MST.
5.1 Identity, Harm and Parental Obligation
The Non-Identity Claim says that, when we use MST,
this causes a (numerically) different person to be born:
that is, someone other than the person who would have
been born if we hadn’t used MST. Now consider the
following example.
Two parents, who have an almost 100% chance of their
child having a mitochondrial disorder if they conceive
naturally, are offered MST to avoid their child having
mitochondrial disease.24 If they decide not to use MST
but conceive naturally, they will have Child A. If they
21 The basis for this claim is that there are other reproductive options,
such as surrogacy or IVF using donated eggs, that are open to parents
but which wouldn’t allow the woman to be genetically related to the
child; Bredenoord & Braude, op. cit. note 1, pp. 87–89.
22 Although concerns may be raised about the possibility of epigenetic
interactions having an impact on identity, they would not be specifically
applicable to cases concerning numerical identity. Epigenetic interac-
tions would only occur after MRT has taken place, so won’t affect the
originating gametes and, consequently, they would be unable to affect
an individual’s numerical identity. Epigenetics may, however, be of
genuine concern where other senses of identity are relevant, such as an
individual’s qualitative identity. In these cases, the development of
qualitative properties through epigenetic interactions could potentially
be identity-affecting. This is an interesting additional consideration but,
as highlighted in section 3, discussion of these other senses of identity is
beyond the scope of this paper.
23 To-date, there has been some debate about whether or not MST and
PNT should be considered ‘genetic modification’. Baylis has argued that
MRTs constitute genetic modification because they involve exchanging
the mitochondrial genes that the intending mother has supplied with the
mitochondrial genes of a donor. Others, such as the UK Department of
Health, also recognize that the use of MRT involves the replacement of
one mitochondrial genome with another. However, it argues that the
mitochondrial genome is only being entirely replaced, rather than
having any one part, or parts, of its genetic constitution modified.
Therefore, in contrast to Baylis, the UK government has instead opted
to refer to MRTs as a form of ‘germ-line modification’ rather than
‘genetic modification’; UKDept. of Health, op. cit. note 5, p. 12; Baylis,
op. cit. note 1, p. 533; Nuffield Council on Bioethics, op. cit. note 1, pp.
57–58; S. Barber & P. Border. Mitochondrial Donation. House of
Commons Library; 2015. SN/SC/6833: 19–21.
24 We are here referring to homoplasmic mutations. While, it is gener-
ally understood to be true that anyone inheriting a homoplasmic
mtDNA mutation will suffer from it, there is a very small chance that a
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decide to accept MST, they wouldn’t have Child A, but a
numerically different child, Child B. Imagine first that the
parents go for unassisted conception, resulting in child A.
Child A suffers from a life-limiting mitochondrial disor-
der. When old enough, the circumstances of her concep-
tion are disclosed to her, including the fact that MST
could have been but was not used. Although Child A may
consider that her parents have harmed her by knowingly
subjecting her to a mitochondrial disorder, it is clear that
although they could have created a different embryo
through MST and have had a child without the disorder,
that child would have been Child B, not Child A. So,
while Child A’s life would have been better if she had
been born without a mitochondrial disorder, that was not
one of the options available. Rather, their choice was
between Child A with and Child B without mitochondrial
disorder. Child A cannot therefore reasonably claim that
she has been harmed (made worse off) by her parents’
decision, for the only available alternative was not a
disorder-free life but non-existence. So provided that
Child A does not feel, all things considered, that she
would be ‘better off dead’, she cannot reasonably claim
to have been harmed by her parents’ reproductive
decision.25
Generalizing from this, one important implication is
that (unless the mitochondrial disease would be so bad
that the child would be ‘better off dead’ – which may be
true of some mitochondrial disorders) the rationale for
using MST can’t be to avoid harm to a particular child.26
The rationale for usingMSTmust instead be one or more
of the following. Firstly, it could be driven by ‘imper-
sonal’ welfare considerations: specifically the thought
that, when there’s a choice between creating one of two
(or more) possible future children, we should choose the
one with the best expected quality of life. Thus faced with
a choice between creating Child A (with a mitochondrial
disorder) and Child B (without a mitochondrial disorder)
the thought is that we should create Child B on the
grounds that her expected quality (and length) of life will
be greater. The underpinning principle at work here is
what Parfit terms the ‘Same Number Quality Claim’, an
idea echoed in a much later article by Julian Savulescu
called ‘Procreative Beneficence’.27
A second possible rationale is the interests of the
parents. Looking after a child with a mitochondrial dis-
order is challenging and, even if they would be good and
loving parents to Child A, they may still prefer instead to
raise a child without a serious genetic disorder. Finally,
cost-saving is another possible (although controversial)
rationale for providing MST.
PNT is in a different position because the Non-Identity
Claim does not apply. Imagine a similar situation to the
one just described but one in which the parents are
offered PNT rather than MST. In this second scenario,
their choice is between rejecting PNT, in which case Child
A will be born with a mitochondrial disorder, and accept-
ing PNT, in which case Child A will be born without a
mitochondrial disorder. PNT is then in effect an attempt
at a ‘pre-emptive’ cure for mitochondrial disorder; one
which happens at the embryonic stage.
This has major implications for the way in which the
idea of harm can be deployed. Imagine that the parents
decline the offer of PNT and that Child A is born with
mitochondrial disease. As in the first scenario, when she is
old enough to understand, the fact that PNT could have
been but was not used is disclosed and she blames her
parents for harming her for (what she sees as) knowingly
subjecting her to this awful disease. The crucial difference
in the PNT scenario is that in this case Child A is correct.
Her parents may or may not have had good reasons for
declining PNT, but – whatever their reasons – it cannot
be denied that their choice harmed Child A. For, had they
used PNT, she would be living without rather than with a
mitochondrial disorder. Thus there is a strong prima facie
harm-avoidance rationale for offering PNT to prospec-
tive parents, and for those parents to accept it; one that is
not present in the case of MST.
It may also be argued, because of this difference vis-à-
vis harm, that parental ethical obligations are different, at
least in strength, between the two cases. For PNT, their
refusal to let Child A benefit from the procedure is in
some respects like harming her during pregnancy by
refusing to accept medication required to protect the
fetus. In both cases (PNT and fetal medicine), Child A
would (eventually) be harmed and – once she comes to be
born – can blame her parents for decisions which harmed
her, or at least which deprived her of benefit. So, if we
think that prospective parents have a moral reason to
refrain from harmful actions during pregnancy, and if we
similarly think that they have a moral reason to consent
to medical procedures needed by their fetus (provided
that these are not unduly onerous or dangerous for the
person could potentially be a carrier and not suffer from the harmful
effects of the mutation; Bredenoord et al., op. cit. note 2, pp. 83–94.
25 S. Wilkinson. Choosing Tomorrow’s Children. Oxford: Oxford Uni-
versity Press: 2010. 4–7.
26 Some mitochondrial disorders manifest in particularly terrible ways
and it might be argued that living with such disorders is worse than not
living at all. For example, Leigh’s Syndrome can cause death to a child
within the first few years (sometimes months) of life. Symptoms during
that time may include the failure of muscular systems (including cardio-
respiratory systems and the ability to swallow), failure of visual systems,
and damage to the nervous system; Nuffield Council on Bioethics, op.
cit. note 1, pp. 27, 73–74.
27 Parfit, op. cit. note 11; J. Savulescu. Procreative Beneficence: Why
We Should Select the Best Children. Bioethics 2001; 15: 413–426.
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woman), then we may similarly feel they are under a
strong obligation to accept PNT in order to protect Child
A from harm.
Although we hold this view to be broadly correct, it is
important to note some caveats. First, there are clearly
differences between intervening at the embryonic stage
and intervening during pregnancy. For example, medi-
cation accepted during pregnancy may affect the preg-
nant woman, whereas this is less likely in the case of
PNT – so, in this respect, the case for accepting PNT
may be stronger. Also, ‘gradualists’ may feel that, at
least in late pregnancy, the fetus has a stronger moral
claim on us to provide beneficial treatment than does an
early embryo.28 So we do not claim that medication
during pregnancy and PNT are identical: merely that
they are similar in important respects. Moreover,
parents and doctors may disagree about what’s best for
the (future) child and if parents declined PNT because
they (reasonably) believed it on balance would do more
harm than good then they would perhaps be less blame-
worthy than parents who decline the treatment for other
reasons.
With MST, since we classify this as selective reproduc-
tion, the parents’ ethical position here is closer to what it
would be when considering practices like PGD and pre-
natal testing. In all such cases, a parental decision to
intervene to avoid mitochondrial disorder would in effect
be a decision to opt for Child B over Child A: choosing
one possible future child over another. It may be that
parents do have a moral obligation to make such a choice
(‘Procreative Beneficence’ could underpin such a duty).
That obligation, however, is less clear, more controver-
sial, and/or perhaps weaker than the ‘child protection’
obligation that is in play in the PNT case.29
So, unless one’s ethical position is strongly ‘imper-
sonal’ and consequentialistic in nature (which is of course
an option and not one we can conclusively refute here) it
will be difficult to resist the conclusion that prospective
parents’ obligations to accept – and, for the same reasons,
clinicians’ and funders’ obligations to provide – PNT are
stronger than their obligations to provide MST (on the
assumption, as we have said, that both are effective and
safe).
5.2 Human Dignity and Eugenics
We briefly turn now to the idea that that concerns about
eugenics and human dignity engage more strongly in
the case of MST than in the case of PNT. If only one of
the two MRT techniques is selective reproduction then
the following argument only applies MST, not PNT:
. . . what is being proposed by the HFEA is not a form
of therapy in which a person is being treated or cured
for a disorder. Instead, it is making sure that certain
persons are not brought into existence. This is a crucial
difference since it then questions the equality in value
and worth of every possible future person. Moreover,
this equality of all existing and possible future human
beings is one of the foundations of inherent human
dignity.30
We do not make any claims here about the soundness
or otherwise of arguments like MacKellar’s, although we
do note that such arguments have been extensively cri-
tiqued in the existing literature.31 Rather our suggestion is
conditional and relative: if such arguments have any
merit (and some people think that they do) then they
apply more forcefully against MST than against PNT,
because only the former is an instance of selective repro-
duction. As MacKellar says, ‘making sure that certain
persons are not brought into existence’ seems especially
problematic for those who take human dignity to be an
important moral principle, as it could be taken to imply
that not all (possible future) persons are ‘equal in value
and worth’ and that some (possible future) persons are
better, more worthy, candidates for existence than others.
Turning to eugenics, there are various different defini-
tions of this contested concept but the common core
which most of them share is that eugenics is the attempt
to improve the human ‘gene pool’.32 On this definition, it
looks as if mitochondrial replacement could be eugenic
because it seeks, amongst other things, to improve the
human ‘gene pool’ by reducing the prevalence of herit-
able mitochondrial disorders in the population. This is
not necessarily an objection to mitochondrial replace-
ment, because the same could be said of the existing
widely accepted alternatives – such as refraining from
having children or using an egg donor. Both of these
are ways not only of having a child free from disorders,
but also of improving the future ‘gene pool’ by avoiding
the passing on of mitochondrial disorders to future
generations. Furthermore, reducing the prevalence of
mitochondrial disorders (be it technically eugenic or not)28 R. Dworkin. Life’s Dominion: An Argument About Abortion and
Euthanasia. London: Harper Collins. 1993; R. Scott. Rights, Duties and
the Body: Law and Ethics of the Maternal-fetal Conflict. Oxford: Hart
Publishing: 2002. 43–56.
29 Savulescu, op. cit. note 27, S. Sheldon & S. Wilkinson. Termination
of Pregnancy for reason of foetal disability: Are there grounds for a
special exception in Law? Medical Law Review 2001; 9: 85–109; S.
Wilkinson. Prenatal Screening, Reproductive Choice, and Public Health
2015; 29: 26–35.
30 C. MacKellar. Should Persons Affected by Mitochondrial Disorders
Not Be Brought Into Existence? Bionews 2014; 736. Available at: http://
www.bionews.org.uk/page_385343.asp [cited 2014 Sept 20].
31 See, for example, Wilkinson op. cit. note 25, pp. 148–185.
32 R. Chadwick. Genetics and Ethics. In: E. Craig, editor. The Routledge
Encyclopaedia of Philosophy. London: Routledge; 1998.
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seems to be a pretty laudable aim and one that many
would endorse. So it may be that in terms of their aims
bothMST and PNT are, in one sense, eugenic although it
does not follow from this that either is unethical. Nor
does it follow that these technologies are any more eugen-
ics than existing methods of selective reproduction (absti-
nence, adoption, egg donation, etc.).
But are MST and PNT equally vulnerable to accusa-
tions of eugenics? Perhaps there are reasons for thinking
that such charges are weaker in the case of PNT. One is
parental motives. In the case of PNT, as we have seen, the
parents can be – and probably should be – focussed on
protecting a determinate child from harm, on ensuring
that he or she gets access to ‘pre-emptive treatment’,
which is what PNT is. So there’s a good chance that the
parents’ reasons for seeking PNT will have nothing to do
with successive generations; rather their concern is
mainly with preventing one particular child from suffer-
ing. In the case ofMST, though, the parents won’t be able
to appeal to this child-protection rationale. Their reasons
for acting must be more ‘impersonal’, more ‘selective’;
they want to avoid having this child (with mitochondrial
disorder) and want instead to have that child (without
mitochondrial disorder). As before, the parents in this
situation won’t necessarily have much interest in popula-
tion health, but it could nonetheless be argued that their
desire to reproduce selectively is more like eugenics than
is the PNT parents’ desire to cure their child. Alterna-
tively, one might argue that such MST-selective decisions
are constitutive of and a means of achieving a wider
eugenics; whereas the same can’t be said of the PNT
parents for whom any eugenic effects are more like the
side-effects of medical treatment.
6. CONCLUSION
At first glance, the two versions of mitochondrial replace-
ment being developed look to be the same in all but some
particular technical respects: one (MST) replaces the
mitochondria in eggs, the other (PNT) replaces the mito-
chondria in embryos. However, we have argued that,
contrary to appearances, MST and PNT are different in
fundamental respects. In particular, PNT is a treatment
which is attempting ‘pre-emptively’ to cure a person
without affecting his or her identity. Thus, PNT is like, or
is even a form of, gene therapy. MST, on the other hand,
is a form of selective reproduction and has more in
common with pre-implantation genetic diagnosis and
pre-natal screening than it does with gene therapy.
What ethical implications does this have? First, all
other things being equal, parents offered PNT have a
stronger obligation to accept it than do parents offered
MST. This is because parents who decline PNT could be
said to be harming their future child, whereas parents
who decline MST will merely be failing to ‘substitute’ one
possible future child with another (failing to ‘de-select’ a
possible future child with a mitochondrial disorder).
Second, because MST is a form of selective reproduction
rather than therapy, concerns about eugenics and human
dignity may engage more strongly in the case of MST
than in the case of PNT.
Therefore, if (and this is a big ‘if’) MST and PNT were
to turn out to be equally safe and effective, we would have
some ethical reason to prefer PNT.
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